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ON THIN AIR: STANDING, CLIMATE
CHANGE, AND THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Kevin T. Haroff*
I. INTRODUCTION
Considerable attention has been given to the growth in litigation
relating to the causes and consequences of global climate change.1 Much
of that attention has focused on litigation centering on the authority of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions under the Federal Clean Air Act
(“CAA”).2 The most notable of these cases is Massachusetts v. EPA,3 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the EPA has authority under
the CAA to regulate vehicle tailpipe emissions of GHGs.4 More recently,
the focus has shifted to cases in which governmental and private party
plaintiffs have brought climate change-related claims based on common
law nuisance theories; however, as a general matter, these cases tend to

*
Kevin T. Haroff (B.A., College of Arts & Sciences, Cornell University, 1977; J.D.,
Cornell Law School, 1981; M.B.A., Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell
University, 1981) is a partner in the San Francisco, California office of Marten Law PLLC.
The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Jared Palmer (B.A., Bowdoin
College, 2006; J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of Law, 2012) who
performed legal research for this Article.
1
See MARK FULTON ET AL., GROWTH OF U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: TRENDS &
CONSEQUENCES (2010), available at http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/_media/US_CC_
Litigation.pdf; see also John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2010, at A1 (discussing climate change cases in the federal courts).
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7626 (2006).
3
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
4
The Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA was limited to section 202(a)(1) of the CAA
and the EPA’s regulation of GHG emissions from mobile sources; however, the decision
suggested that the federal government also has the authority to regulate GHG emissions
from stationary sources, like coal-fired electrical generation units (“EGUs”). Id. at 528–29.
In Coke Oven Environmental Taskforce v. EPA, ten states, two cities, and three environmental
groups challenged EPA’s refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants
under EPA regulations governing stationary sources. Petition for Review, Coke Oven
Envtl. Taskforce v. EPA, No. 06-1149 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2006). The court subsequently
remanded the matter to the EPA for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2007)
(order remanding in light of new case law). In December 2010, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement that required the EPA to promulgate GHG standards of performance
for new and modified Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (“EGUs”) by May 26, 2012.
New York v. EPA Settlement Agreement, available at http://www.epa.gov/airquality/
pdfs/boilerghgsettlement.pdf.
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get dismissed on grounds that the claims asserted raise non-justiciable
political questions or are preempted by the EPA’s regulatory powers.5
Less attention has been given to climate change litigation brought
under the first and arguably most wide-ranging of modern U.S.
environmental laws: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(“NEPA”).6 NEPA is the principal federal statute that reflects the
country’s priorities for protecting the natural environment from
degradation by humans. Congress declared that “it is the continuing
policy of the [f]ederal [g]overnment . . . to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
Congress also directed the federal
generations of Americans.”7

See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs cannot proceed because they have no standing and
because of the political question doctrine); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06–
05755MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (explaining why the political
question doctrine is a bar to these types of suits); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th
Cir. 2009) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing on political
question grounds); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the
original action brought under the federal common law of nuisance or, in the alternative,
state nuisance law, to compel various electric power utilities to cap and then reduce their
GHG emissions); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Corey Schaecher, Why Trial
Courts Have Been Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803, 813 (2010)
(noting that every time such a case has come before a federal judge, the judge has
dismissed the case based on the political question doctrine). The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari review in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. and overturned the
decision of the appellate court in light of Massachusetts v. EPA. Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). The Court found that the authority given to the EPA to
regulate GHG emissions under the CAA displaced federal common law claims involving
the same subject matter. Id.
6
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)). The enactment of NEPA predates
by one year the 1970 enactment of the modern CAA. Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-604, § 111, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). NEPA, therefore, should be viewed as an
important point of reference for courts seeking to construe Congress’ intent concerning the
EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.
7
National Environmental Policy Act § 101(b). Congress also declared that:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing
responsibility of the [f]ederal [g]overnment to use all practicable
means, consist [sic] with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate [f]ederal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the [n]ation may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
5
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government to promote that policy through a detailed analysis of the
environmental impacts of “proposals for legislation and other major
[f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”8
The notion that climate change is an environmental impact that
warrants consideration under NEPA is a relatively recent development.9
The issue was raised in only a few cases brought by environmental
groups and government entities in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
none of those cases provided a basis for directing further federal agency
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an
environment which supports diversity, and variety of individual
choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s
amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
Id.
Id. § 102(C). Specifically, with respect to all such legislative proposals and “major”
federal actions, agencies must provide:
a detailed statement . . . on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
Id.
9
Concern over climate change was mentioned only in passing during the congressional
hearings leading to NEPA’s enactment in 1969. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, at 5–6 (1969). The
report cited testimony by Dr. David M. Gates, director of the Missouri Botanical Gardens
and Chairman of the Board of Advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Environment,
that:
[t]he complexity of the earth’s ecosystem . . . makes understanding it
and the management of it a massive challenge . . . [i]s the climate
changing in an unnatural manner . . . [h]ow much production of
inorganic products can we produce [sic] without fouling the global
system . . . [t]oday we are manipulating an extremely complex system:
The ecosystems of the earth, the units of the landscape, and we do not
know the consequences of our actions until it is too late.
Id. (emphasis added).
8
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action.10 The idea began to receive serious attention in the late 1990s,
however, when the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) issued
draft guidance encouraging federal government agencies to consider
climate change as part of their routine analysis of the environmental
impacts of federal programs and actions.11 The draft guidance reviewed
what was then the current scientific understanding of climate change
and the evolving concern that human activities involving the emission of
GHGs—particularly carbon dioxide—were the principal cause of the
phenomenon. The draft guidance stated that, while “very few federal
agencies to date have focused on global climatic change in their NEPA
documents, federal agencies should be aware of how their proposals
may contribute to or be affected by climatic changes,” and that “[e]ach
[federal] agency must exercise its own independent judgment and
discretion . . . to determine the extent to which it should assess global
climate change in its NEPA documents.”12
In the nearly fifteen years since CEQ issued its initial draft guidance,
there has been a dramatic growth in litigation asserting climate change
claims under both NEPA and various corollary state law statutes,
including the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).13 At the
same time, however, some attempts to use NEPA as a means of
responding to the challenges of global climate change may have gone
beyond what Congress likely intended when the statute was enacted.
This Article will provide an overview of NEPA and some of the issues
raised in litigation to address climate change in that context, focusing on
whether plaintiffs are sufficiently injured by potential climate change to
have standing to challenge federal agency decision-making.14 The
Article will also address the potential implications of Massachusetts v.
10
See, e.g., Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992)
(challenging forty-two actions and programs by the U.S. Departments of Energy,
Agriculture, and the Interior for failure to evaluate their implications for the “greenhouse
effect” under NEPA); City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (challenging federal fuel economy standards based on a failure to
consider global warming as part of a NEPA review).
11
See Memorandum from Dinah Bear, CEQ Gen. Counsel, to all Federal Agency NEPA
Liaisons, Re: Draft Guidance Regarding Consideration of Global Climatic Change in
Environmental Documents Prepared Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(Oct. 8, 1997) (on file with author), available at http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/
compliance/reports/ceqmemo.pdf. The CEQ was established within the Executive Office
of the President and oversees federal agency implementation of, and compliance with,
NEPA pursuant to the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344 (2006).
12
Memorandum from Dinah Bear to all Federal Agency NEPA Liaisons, supra note 11, at
5.
13
California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2010).
14
See infra Parts II–III (discussing the NEPA and recent Supreme Court cases applying
the NEPA to standing issues).
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EPA, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, and Monsanto v. Geertson Seed
Farms, three recent Supreme Court decisions addressing standing and
available remedies in NEPA cases.15 The Article then examines
constitutional standing for global climate change cases brought under
the NEPA.16
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NEPA PROCESS
As noted, the NEPA review process is triggered whenever a federal
agency proposes “legislation [or] other major [f]ederal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”17 The
statute does not define what constitutes a “[m]ajor [f]ederal action,” and
CEQ’s implementing regulations on this subject are vague and
somewhat circular.18 Determining whether a federal action is a “major”
federal action depends fundamentally on whether its environmental
impacts are “significant[].”19 The impacts’ significance depends on their
context and intensity.20 Moreover, actions may cause environmental

See infra Part IV (discussing Massachusetts, Summers, and Monsanto).
See infra Part VI (examining recent cases such as Border Power Plant Working Group v.
DOE, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, and Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department
of the Interior).
17
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)).
18
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2010) (defining “[m]ajor [f]ederal action” as “actions with
effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to [f]ederal control and
responsibility”). The regulations do provide that major federal actions generally fall within
one or more listed categories, including:
(1) Adoption of official policy such as rules, regulations, and
[formally adopted administrative] interpretations . . . treaties and
international conventions or agreements; formal documents
establishing an agency’s policies which will result in or substantially
alter agency programs.
(2) Adoption of formal plans . . . which guide or prescribe
alternative uses of [f]ederal resources . . . .
(3) Adoption of programs . . . [or] systematic and connected
agency decisions allocating agency resources . . . .
(4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or
management activities located in a defined geographic area.
Id. § 1508.18(b)(1)–(4).
19
See id. § 1508.18 (“Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of
significantly.”).
20
Id. § 1508.27(a)–(b). “[T]he significance of an action must be analyzed in several
contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the affected
interests, and the locality. [It can also] var[y] with the setting of the proposed action.” Id.
§ 1508.27(a). “Intensity . . . refers to the severity of impact.” Id. § 1508.27(b) (emphasis
omitted). It takes the following considerations into account:
(1) Impacts . . . may be both beneficial and adverse. . . .
15
16
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effects that may not be significant in their own right, but could
contribute to a cumulative impact that is significant.21
Once an agency decides that a proposed action is a major federal
action triggering NEPA, it must then determine whether to prepare an
environmental impact statement (“EIS”).22 The agency normally will
prepare an EIS if the proposal is of a type that typically requires one.23 If
the proposal is, instead, covered by a categorical exemption for projects
not typically expected to have significant environmental consequences,
no further environmental review is required under NEPA.24 In any other
(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health
or safety.
(3) Unique characteristics of the [affected] geographic area . . . .
(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human
environment are likely to be highly controversial.
....
(6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for
future actions with significant effects . . . .
(7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually
insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. . . .
(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect . . . [or]
cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historical
resources.
(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an
endangered or threatened species or its habitat . . . .
(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of [f]ederal, [s]tate,
or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the
environment.
Id. § 1508.27(b)(1)–(10).
21
“Cumulative impact” is defined in the CEQ’s regulations as “the impact on the
environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . . ” Id. § 1508.7 (emphasis
omitted); cf. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 413–14 (1976) (explaining the importance
of administrative agencies in defining cumulative effects).
22
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th
Cir. 2001).
23
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(1).
24
Id. § 1501.4(a)(2). A “categorical exclusion [may be available for] actions which do not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment” (i.e.,
actions that do not really meet the definition of a major federal action in the first place) or
which an agency has found, pursuant to its implementing regulations, are of a type that
would have “no such effect.” Id. § 1508.4 (emphasis omitted). Categorical exclusions
typically are available for routine, general administrative, or operational activities. See, e.g.,
10 C.F.R. § 1021(d) (2010) (listing these exclusions). Appendix A contains Department of
Energy (“DOE”) categorical exclusions for general agency activities such as “[r]outine
administrative/financial/personnel actions[,] . . . [c]ontract interpretations/amendments/
modifications, clarifying or administrative[,] . . . [t]ransfer of property, use unchanged[, and
the] [a]ward of contracts for technical support/management and operation/personal
services.” Id. at app. A. Appendix B contains DOE categorical exclusions for specific
agency actions such as minor rate increases, training exercises and simulations, and routine
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circumstance, an agency will normally prepare an initial environmental
assessment (“EA”) of the project’s potential environmental impacts.25
EAs are intended to be concise, public documents that contain “sufficient
evidence and analysis [to allow] for [a] determin[ation] [of] whether to
prepare [either] an [EIS] or a finding of no significant impact”
(“FONSI”).26 A FONSI is a finding that the project will not have
significant environmental impacts or that those impacts will be
effectively mitigated through project modifications.27 If no categorical
exclusion applies, and issuance of a FONSI cannot be justified, the
agency ordinarily must prepare an EIS. An EIS is typically prepared
using a standard format that includes, among other things: (1) a
description of the purpose of, and need for, the proposed action; (2) a
discussion of alternatives to the proposed action, including the proposed
action itself; (3) a description of the affected environment; and (4) an
analysis of the proposal’s environmental consequences.28
The preparation of an EIS is a public process, and interested
individuals and agencies are afforded opportunities to submit comments
on a draft version of the document.29 The agency preparing the EIS must
consider comments received and must respond in one or more of the
following ways by:
“(1) [m]odify[ing] alternatives including the
proposed action[;] (2) [d]evelop[ing] and evaluat[ing] alternatives not
previously given serious consideration by the agency[;] (3)
[s]upplement[ing], improv[ing], or modify[ing] its analyses[;] (4)
[m]ak[ing] factual corrections[; and/or] (5) [e]xplain[ing] why the
comments do not warrant further agency response . . . . ”30 Changes
made as a result of these responses must be reflected in the final EIR,
which can then be used as the basis for final agency action with respect
to the proposal described in the document.
NEPA itself does not provide any mechanism for challenging the
adequacy of an EIS, or the way in which the EIS was prepared, under the
law. Unlike many other federal environmental laws, NEPA does not
include a so-called “citizen suit” provision that allows private parties to

maintenance/custodial services for buildings, structures, infrastructures, and equipment.
Id. at app. B.
25
Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 433 F.3d 772, 780 (10th Cir. 2006); 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4(c).
26
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.
27
Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005);
Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 2003); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13.
28
40 C.F.R. § 1502.10.
29
Id. § 1503.1.
30
Id. § 1503.4(a).
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initiate civil actions to enjoin compliance with the statute.31 Instead,
actions to prosecute claims for alleged NEPA violations must be brought
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),32 on grounds that a
U.S. governmental agency has failed to comply with applicable
procedural requirements in approving the proposed action.33 Under the
APA, any person “aggrieved” by a federal agency action may bring a
lawsuit to challenge the action as procedurally deficient or otherwise
inconsistent with applicable law; this includes the provisions of NEPA.34
The Court, on several occasions, has defined the essential requirements
for aggrieved parties to bring suit against a federal agency under the
NEPA.
III. THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
CASES: LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE AND FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V.
LAIDLAW
The 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,35
is the seminal case defining the contemporary requirements for standing
in environmental cases. Lujan was not a NEPA case; rather, it
specifically concerned the authority of the Department of the Interior to
adopt regulations implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”).36 Nevertheless, it has been cited widely as the case that
delineated the principal criteria for standing that must be met by

31
See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990)) (“[N]o provision of NEPA explicitly grants any
person or entity standing to enforce the statute.”). An example of a citizen suit provision
that has been widely used over the years is section 505 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006). Section 505 provides, subject to certain limitations, that:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be
in violation of [the Act] . . . or
(2) against the Administrator [of the United States EPA] to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
Id.
32
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
33
Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176–77.
34
5 U.S.C. § 702(a).
35
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
36
16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). The regulations at issue in the case were ones intended “to
render [the statute] applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas.”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558.
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plaintiffs challenging governmental action under NEPA, as well as other
federal environmental statutes.37
The majority opinion in Lujan, delivered by Justice Scalia, provides a
succinct summary of federal judicial standing requirements. According
to Justice Scalia:
Over the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
“actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”
Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to
be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court.” Third,
it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,”
that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision.”38
The Lujan Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the first of
these criteria, “injury in fact,” because they were unable to show how the
government’s implementing regulation resulted in imminent injury to
their personal interests.39 According to the Court, “‘the “injury in fact”
test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that
the party seeking review be himself among the injured.’”40 The Court
also found the plaintiffs failed to meet the third criterion—
37
See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (denying standing to
environmental groups challenging regulations governing procedures for decisions
implementing land and resource development plans under the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (allowing standing to an environmental group seeking
imposition of injunctive relief in a citizen suit under the CWA); Salmon Spawning &
Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying standing to an
environmental group seeking to pursue claims against the National Marine Fisheries
Service, the Department of Commerce, and the State Department). Furthermore, it was
alleged that United States’ entry and participation in the Pacific Salmon Treaty (“Treaty”)
violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the APA. Id.; Pye v. United States, 269
F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2001) (allowing standing to a neighboring landowner challenging a U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to issue a permit to construct a road crossing within the
waters of the United States).
38
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
39
Id. at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
See id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)).
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“redressability”—because they had chosen to challenge a generalized
level of government action, ESA implementing regulations, rather than
attack separate decisions involving particular projects that might
allegedly have caused them harm.41 According to Justice Scalia, “‘suits
challenging, not specifically identifiable [g]overnment violations of law,
but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal
obligations . . . [are], even when premised on allegations of several
instances of violations of law, . . . rarely if ever appropriate for federalcourt adjudication.’”42
Finally, the Court addressed the claim that respondents had
standing because they had suffered a “procedural injury.” The Court
based its determination on the ESA’s “citizen suit” provision, which
states that, “‘any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of’” the statute.43 The appellate court held that this “provision
create[d] a procedural righ[t] . . . in all ‘persons,’—so that anyone could
file a suit” challenging the government’s “failure to follow [ESA
procedures], notwithstanding [the absence of] any discrete injury
flowing from that failure.”44 The Supreme Court rejected that position,
largely on the grounds that plaintiffs’ ESA challenge was no more
unique to the plaintiffs than to members of the public at large, and
therefore, it did not state a justiciable case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution.45
The majority opinion in Lujan did not hold that a plaintiff could
never establish injury based solely on a “procedural injury;” indeed,
Justice Scalia specifically distinguished the case from one:
where plaintiffs [were] seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement the disregard of which could impair a
separate concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural
requirement for a hearing prior to denial of their license
application, or the procedural requirement for an

Id. at 568.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–60 (1984)).
43
Id. at 571–72 (alteration in original); see 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006) (setting forth the
ESA’s citizen suit provision).
44
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting the court of appeals’ decision
at 911 F.2d 117, 121–22 (8th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45
Id. at 573–74.
41
42

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/3

Haroff: On Thin Air: Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environme

2012]

On Thin Air

421

environmental impact statement before a federal facility
is constructed next door to them).46
Moreover, the Court made clear that “[n]othing in this [opinion]
contradicts the principle that ‘[t]he . . . injury required by [Article] III
may exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing.”’”47
Despite these qualifications, Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice
O’Connor joined, wrote a strong dissent arguing that the majority had
sought “to impose fresh limitations on the constitutional authority of
Congress to allow citizen suits in the federal courts for injuries deemed
‘procedural’ in nature,” and “conclud[ed] that any ‘procedural injury’
suffered by respondents is insufficient to confer standing.”48 The dissent
rejected this conclusion, and pointed out that the Court in fact had found
standing in prior cases involving “procedurally oriented statutes,”
including NEPA.49 Justice Blackmun then expressed the “hope[] that
over time the Court will acknowledge that some classes of procedural
duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of a substantive, concrete
harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient
likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural duty.”50
The notion that the majority opinion in Lujan imposed fresh
limitations on the authority of Congress to allow citizen suits in the
federal courts was undermined to some degree by the Court’s decision in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.51 Like
Id. at 572.
Id. at 578 (alteration in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Scalia went on to clarify, however, that:
As we said in Sierra Club, “[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of
injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter
from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must
himself have suffered an injury.” Whether or not the principle set
forth in Warth can be extended beyond that distinction, . . . in suits
against the [g]overnment, at least, the concrete injury requirement
must remain.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
48
Id. at 589–90, 601 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49
Id. at 603 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348
(1989)). The “Court considered injury from violation of the ‘action-forcing’ procedures of
[NEPA], in particular the requirements for issuance of [EIS].” Id.
50
Id. at 605. Expressing his hopes for future expansion of standing to incorporate
strictly procedural injuries, Justice Blackmun observed that he could not join the majority
opining in what he thought “amount[ed] to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of
environmental standing. In my view, ‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.’” Id. at 606 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
51
528 U.S. 167 (2000).
46
47
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Lujan, Laidlaw focused on the issue of standing to sue under a direct
citizen suit provision of a federal environmental statute—in this case, the
Federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”).52 Several environmental groups
brought the case, seeking injunctive relief and the imposition of civil
penalties, for alleged violations of a state-issued permit authorizing the
discharge of treated industrial wastewater into the North Tyger River in
South Carolina.53 The government moved for summary judgment on,
inter alia, the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence
demonstrating injury in fact, as required under Lujan, and that the
plaintiffs therefore lacked Article III standing to bring the lawsuit.54 The
Court, however, rejected the defendant’s argument on this point.
Relying on its decision in Lujan, the Court found that factual
averments in affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs adequately
documented the existence of an injury in fact.55 The Court pointed out
that it had previously “held that environmental plaintiffs adequately
allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and
are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area
will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.”56 That these averments
were conditional in nature—claiming that the plaintiffs’ members would
use the North Tyger River for recreation if it were not being polluted—
was not material in this context. According to the Court, they still could
not be equated with the speculative “‘“some day” intentions’ to visit
endangered species halfway around the world,” which the Court found
insufficient to show injury in fact in Lujan.57
The Laidlaw case did not deal with NEPA per se. Nevertheless, the
Court’s discussion of the standing issue bears directly on the capacity of
private citizens to pursue challenges under NEPA—including actions
with potential global climate change consequences. The Court stated
52
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). Section 505(a) of the CWA authorizes any “person or persons
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected” by an alleged violation of the
statute to bring an action to compel future compliance with the Act, through the imposition
of injunctive relief or civil penalties. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g).
53
The permit was issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control (“DHEC”), acting pursuant to authority delegated to it under the
CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (delegating authority under the CWA).
54
Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 177.
55
Id. at 180–82. The factual averments stated, for example, that the plaintiffs’ members
lived near the permitted discharge point, occasionally drove over the river, which looked
and smelled polluted, and would like to fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near the river
but would not do so because of concerns that the river was polluted. Id.
56
Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). The Court stated,
“‘[o]f course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing.’” Id. (quoting Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992)).
57
Id. at 169 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).
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that its ruling on standing in Laidlaw was entirely consistent with its
earlier decision in Lujan, which involved both NEPA and the APA.58 In
Lujan, the Court held that the plaintiff could not establish standing to sue
“merely by offering ‘averments which state only that one of [the
organization’s] members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract
of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or
probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action.’”59 In contrast,
the Laidlaw Court found that the “reasonable concerns” expressed by the
plaintiffs and their members about the effects of pollutant discharges to
the North Tyger River “directly affected” their “recreational, aesthetic,
and economic interests,” and they “present[ed] dispositively more than
the mere ‘general averments’ and ‘conclusory allegations’ found
inadequate in Lujan . . . .”60
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
CASES
Since its decision in Laidlaw, the Supreme Court has decided several
cases addressing standing in environmental cases. The first of these,
Massachusetts v. EPA, considered the issue in the context of global climate
change.61 Two years after the Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, it
elaborated on the standing issue in Summers v. Earth Island Institute.62
Finally, in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,63 the Court dealt with
standing explicitly in the context of NEPA.64 Each of these cases reflect a
commitment by the Court to stand by the strict requirements for
standing articulated in Lujan. Furthermore, these cases suggest that the
relatively cavalier approach taken in cases such as Border Power and
Watson would not and should not be sustained.65 This Part addresses
each of these cases in turn, beginning with Massachusetts v. EPA.
58
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). The plaintiff in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation alleged that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) and other federal parties had violated the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) and NEPA in the course of administering the BLM’s land
withdrawal appraisal program, pursuant to which they make various decisions affecting
the status of public lands and their availability for private uses, including mining. Id. The
plaintiff contended that the program should be set aside because it was arbitrary, variable,
an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law. Id.
59
Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 169 (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 889).
60
Id. at 169.
61
See infra Part IV.A (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA).
62
See infra Part IV.B (discussing Summers v. Earth Island Institute).
63
130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
64
See infra Part IV.C (discussing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms).
65
See infra Part V (applying the principles in Lujan, Massachusetts, Summers, and
Monsanto to district court cases).
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A. Massachusetts v. EPA
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA.66 The case addressed the EPA’s authority to
regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.67 The plaintiffs, which
included twelve states, four local government entities, and a variety of
environmental and public interest groups, specifically challenged the
EPA’s rejection of rulemaking petitions regarding the regulation of
tailpipe emissions from cars and trucks under Section 202(a)(1) of the
CAA.68 Of the various governmental and private party plaintiffs,
however, only the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was found to have
standing.69
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA framed its standing analysis
squarely within the requirements described in Lujan, noting that:
To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan
holds that a litigant must demonstrate that it has
suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is
either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly
traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a
favorable decision will redress that injury.70
Moreover, “a litigant to whom Congress has ‘accorded a procedural
right to protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”71
Finding that only Massachusetts had standing within this framework,
the Court stated that it was “of considerable relevance that the party
seeking review . . . is a sovereign [s]tate and not, as it was in Lujan, a
private individual.”72 The Court noted that Congress had granted a
procedural right under the APA to challenge the rejection of
Massachusetts’ rulemaking petition. It also found that, given this right
and “Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing
analysis.”73

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
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Id. at 498.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 517–18.
Id. at 518.
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Despite this entitlement to “special solicitude,” the majority opinion
in Massachusetts v. EPA made it clear that Massachusetts’ right to
challenge the EPA’s actions met the fundamental requirements of
standing enunciated in Lujan. According to the Court, “petitioners’
submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most
demanding standards of the adversarial process. [The] EPA’s steadfast
refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions presents a risk of harm to
Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent’” and therefore
sufficient to show injury in fact to Massachusetts’ concrete interests.74
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, was persuaded to grant
Massachusetts standing based, in part, on Massachusetts’ argument that
it was jeopardized imminently by rising sea levels, which had already
begun to engulf the state’s coastal land.75 Moreover, those changes had,
and would continue to have, a direct and particularized impact on
Massachusetts, which owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal
property and operates or maintains a wide variety of coastal-related
public resources and infrastructure.76
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized Justice Stevens’
willingness to give Massachusetts a special status for standing purposes
and Stevens’ conclusion that the Commonwealth had suffered injury in
fact under Lujan. On the latter point, Justice Roberts specifically
disagreed with the suggestion that Massachusetts’ global warmingrelated injuries could legitimately be considered actual, not conjectural,
although by and large these criticisms really centered on the weight
given by Justice Stevens to the facts offered by Massachusetts as
evidence of its purported coastal injuries.77 Of perhaps greater note is
Justice Roberts’ observation regarding the connection between injury in
fact and the two other elements of any standing analysis under Lujan:
causation and redressability. According to Justice Roberts:
Petitioners’ reliance on Massachusetts’[] loss of coastal
land as their injury in fact for standing purposes creates
insurmountable problems for them with respect to
causation and redressability. To establish standing,
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
76
Id. at 541 n.19.
77
See id. at 542–43 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992)). As
described by Justice Roberts, the Court observes that “global sea levels rose somewhere
between [ten] and [twenty] centimeters over the [twentieth] century as a result of global
warming” and that “[t]hese rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’
coastal land.” Id. at 522 (citation omitted). But none of petitioners’ declarations supports
that connection. Id. at 541.
74
75
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petitioners must show a causal connection between that
specific injury and the lack of new motor vehicle [GHG]
emission standards, and that the promulgation of such
standards would likely redress that injury. As is often
the case, the questions of causation and redressability
overlap. And importantly, when a party is challenging
the [g]overnment’s allegedly unlawful regulation, or
lack of regulation, of a third party, satisfying the
causation and redressability requirements becomes
“substantially more difficult.”78
Justice Roberts emphasized that causation and redressability are
significant considerations in the analysis of standing in most cases. What
Justice Roberts did not acknowledge, however, is that, even under Lujan,
these factors, particularly redressability, are less significant in cases
where the injury in fact is a procedural one.79 Fundamental to the
majority’s analysis of Massachusetts’ standing, as previously noted, was
the fact that Congress had given Massachusetts a procedural right under
the APA to challenge the EPA’s decision not to regulate GHG emissions;
this was part of Justice Stevens justification, giving Massachusetts
“special solicitude in our standing analysis.”80 Thus, to the extent that
the injury in fact suffered by Massachusetts had a procedural
78
Id. at 542−43 (citation omitted) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). As to the issue of
causation, Justice Roberts observed:
Petitioners are never able to trace their alleged injuries back through
this complex web to the fractional amount of global emissions that
might have been limited with EPA standards. In light of the bit-part
domestic new motor vehicle [GHG] emissions have played in what
petitioners describe as a 150-year global phenomenon, and the myriad
additional factors bearing on petitioners’ alleged injury—the loss of
Massachusetts coastal land—the connection is far too speculative to
establish causation.
Id. As to redressability, Justice Roberts rejected the majority’s contention that:
[R]egulating domestic motor vehicle emissions will reduce carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere, and therefore redress Massachusetts’s injury.
But even if regulation does reduce emissions—to some indeterminate
degree, given events elsewhere in the world—the Court never explains
why that makes it likely that the injury in fact—the loss of land—will
be redressed. Schoolchildren know that a kingdom might be lost “all
for the want of a horseshoe nail,” but “likely” redressability is a
different matter.
Id. at 546.
79
Id. at 517–18 (ruling that the person who has been “‘accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests’ . . . ‘can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy’”).
80
Id. at 520.
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component, the hurdles presented by causation and redressability
presumably are diminished under the traditional standing analysis, with
a more rigorous assessment of those factors arguably becoming
unnecessary.
The implications of an injury in fact being procedural in nature are
particularly important in NEPA cases, as that is the essence of the injury
that occurs whenever NEPA is violated. Thus, in evaluating standing
claims made by plaintiffs in cases raising claim change issues under
NEPA, the principal inquiry can legitimately focus on whether those
plaintiffs can show a “concrete and particularized” injury to their
interest that is “actual or imminent,” and not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical.” As the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions on
standing in environmental cases confirm, the failure to make such a
showing would be fatal.81
B. Summers v. Earth Island Institute
On March 3, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5–4 decision,
Summers v. Earth Island Institute,82 reversing a holding by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that allowed environmental groups to
challenge certain federal actions in the absence of a dispute over their
concrete application. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court
affirmed the principle that standing requires at least some showing that
members of these groups would suffer a concrete injury to their interests,
even when those interests are just procedural in nature.

81
In a recent decision involving claims based on climate change, the Supreme Court
brushed aside preliminary objections that the plaintiffs (several states, the City of New
York, and three private land trusts) could maintain federal common law public nuisance
claims against carbon-dioxide emitters (four private power companies and the federal
Tennessee Valley Authority). Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg stated that:
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to
adjudicate this case. Four members of the Court would hold that at
least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts [v.
EPA], which permitted a [s]tate to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate
[GHG] emissions, and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars
review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion
in Massachusetts [v. EPA], or regarding that decision as distinguishable,
would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing. We
therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s
exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.
Id. at 2535 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33, 44 (1941).
82
555 U.S. 488 (2009).
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In December 2003, five environmental groups filed suit in the
Eastern District of California challenging a U.S. Forest Service (“Service”)
decision.83 The Service refused to apply certain procedural requirements
to the Burnt Ridge Project, a decision to hold a salvage sale of timber
damaged by a fire on two hundred and thirty-eight acres of forestland in
the Sequoia National Forest. These requirements had been included in
regulations the Service adopted to implement the Forest Service
Decision-Making and Appeals Reform Act of 1992 (“Act”).84 The
regulations exempted certain projects, including salvage timber sales,
from the Service’s general notice and comment and administrative
appeals procedures if the projects were otherwise exempt from
requirements to prepare an EIS or EA.85
The district court initially granted the plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction to prevent the Burnt Ridge Project from going
forward. The parties subsequently entered into a settlement that
removed the validity of the Burnt Ridge sale as an issue in the case.86
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that plaintiffs retained
standing to pursue claims that the Service’s procedural regulations were
invalid as a general matter. It then adjudicated the merits of those
claims, deciding in favor of the plaintiffs and entering a nationwide
injunction against application of the regulations.87
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the
Service’s procedural exemptions were invalid, and upheld the
nationwide injunction.88 The government then sought review of two
issues in the U.S. Supreme Court: (1) whether the respondents had
standing to pursue their challenge of the Service’s regulations in light of
the settlement of their specific dispute over the Burnt Ridge Project; and
(2) whether a nationwide injunction was appropriate relief. The Court
ruled against the respondents on the first issue and did not address the
second issue.
83
The groups that brought the case included the Earth Island Institute, the Sequoia
Forest Keeper, the Center for Biological Diversity, Heartwood, Inc., and the Sierra Club. Id.
84
Forest Service Decision-Making and Appeals Reform Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-381,
§ 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006)).
85
36 C.F.R. §§ 215(a), 215.12(f) (2010).
86
Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal. 2005), amended in part
sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 490 F.3d 687 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
87
Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 490 F.3d 687 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
88
Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
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Justice Scalia’s majority opinion summarized the familiar Lujan
requirements for standing in the context of a request for injunctive
relief.89 It also recognized the right of environmental and other groups
to claim standing on the basis of injuries to the interests of their
members.90 Finally, it accepted, as the government had conceded, that
the respondents might have maintained standing had the injuries alleged
in connection with the Burnt Ridge Project continued to be at issue. The
problem, however, was that respondents had settled their concerns
regarding the Burnt Ridge Project, and the injuries they alleged in that
connection were therefore no longer at issue. In sum, even if there had
been a legitimate basis for bringing their lawsuit in the first place,
plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished it through their settlement. According
to Justice Scalia:
We know of no precedent for the proposition that when
a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain
action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he
retains standing to challenge the basis for that action
(here, the regulation in the abstract), apart from any
concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his
interests. Such a holding would fly in the face of Article
III’s injury-in-fact requirement.91
The opinion also dismissed the argument that respondents had
standing to maintain their suit because of a procedural injury, namely
that they had been and would continue to be denied the ability to file
comments on some Service actions under the challenged regulations. As
Justice Scalia stated, “deprivation of a procedural right without some
concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right
in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”92 Moreover, “[i]t

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
Id.
91
Id. at 1149–50 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). Other than
with respect to the Burnt Ridge Project, plaintiffs submitted only a single affidavit to the
district court to document “injuries” sufficient to support standing to challenge the
Service’s procedural regulation. Id. The affidavit included statements by one of the
plaintiffs that he had been injured in the past by development on Service land, that he had
visited many National Forests before, and that he planned to visit several unnamed
National Forests in the future. Id. at 1149. The affidavit failed to mention any particular
timber sale or other project subject to the regulations at issue. Id. The majority opinion
dismissed these statements as insufficient to “‘support a finding of the “actual or
imminent” injury that our cases require.’” Id. at 1151 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).
92
Id.
89
90

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 3

430

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

makes no difference [whether a] procedural right has been accorded by
Congress[, as in fact was true in the present case]. That can loosen the
strictures of the redressability prong of our standing inquiry . . . . Unlike
redressability, however, the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor
of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”93
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg. The dissent criticized the majority’s standing analysis,
suggesting that it relied too heavily on an argument that the alleged
injury to a plaintiff’s interest must be “imminent,” as opposed to
conjectural or hypothetical. Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Court
had, in the past, “used the word ‘imminent’ in the context of
constitutional standing.”94 But, he argued, the word was “more
appropriately considered in the context of ripeness or the necessity of
injunctive relief.”95 When it comes to standing all that is necessary is that
“there is a realistic likelihood that the challenged future conduct will, in
fact, recur and harm the plaintiff.”96 Proposing this “realistic likelihood”
test, the dissent relied on the Court’s 1983 decision in Lyons,97 which
predated Lujan’s definitive articulation of the requirements for standing
by nearly a decade.98
The dissent also suggested that its standing analysis complied with
Massachusetts v. EPA. Justice Breyer viewed Massachusetts v. EPA as
holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had “standing to
complain of a procedural failing, namely, EPA’s failure properly to
determine whether to restrict carbon dioxide emissions, even though that
failing would create Massachusetts-based harm which (though likely to
occur) might not occur for several decades.”99 As discussed, however,
this characterization is incomplete and somewhat misleading. First,
Massachusetts did not merely rely on a characterization of harms it faced
through global warming as a “procedural” injury; rather, it offered
factual evidence that the Commonwealth was currently suffering
concrete harm as a result of global warming.100 Second, Massachusetts,
Id.
Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1156 (emphasis in original).
97
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
98
Lyons addressed a set of facts that bore little resemblance to the issues in Lujan and
Summers. See id. at 107, 108 n.7 (discussing how the plaintiff had been subject to an
unlawful police chokehold in the past and was found to lack standing absent a showing
that there was a “realistic threat” that possible recurrence of this behavior would cause him
harm in the reasonably near future).
99
Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007)).
100
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522. As the Court indicated:
93
94
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as a state, had a special “stake in protecting . . . quasi-sovereign interests,
which entitled [it] to special solicitude in [the Court’s] standing
analysis.”101 Without its combined demonstration of present injury and
“quasi-sovereign” status, there is no reason to believe that Massachusetts
(any more than the other public and private petitioners) would have
been granted the right to proceed. Justice Breyer’s suggestion in the
dissent in Summers—that Article III standing can be established through
prediction of a harm that “might not occur for several decades”—is
inconsistent with Massachusetts v. EPA and with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on standing, developed subsequent to Lujan.102
Summers was initially criticized by some as imposing new limitations
on the rights of plaintiffs to seek redress for environmental wrongs in
federal court.103 These criticisms were unwarranted. The Summers
decision simply confirmed the principal that has been widely
recognized, since Lujan, as fundamental to the constitutional doctrine of
According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose
somewhere between [ten] and [twenty] centimeters over the
[twentieth] century as a result of global warming. These rising seas
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. Because
the Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal
property,” it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
landowner. The severity of that injury will only increase over the
course of the next century . . . .
Id. at 522–23 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
101
Id. at 520.
102
Summers, 555 U.S. at 506. In addition to its criticism of the majority opinion’s
discussion of the test for standing under Article III, the dissent questioned its failure to
consider various affidavits submitted by respondents in an endeavor to establish injury
subsequent to the district court’s judgment. Id. at 508−09. In making this point, the dissent
relied on “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which says that ‘[t]he court may permit
supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or
defense.’” Id. at 509 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d)). The majority dismissed this argument
out of hand, stating that:
The dissent cites no instance in which “supplementation” has been
permitted to resurrect and alter the outcome in a case that has gone to
judgment, and indeed after notice of appeal had been filed. If Rule
15(b) allows additional facts to be inserted into the record after appeal
has been filed, we are at the threshold of a brave new world of trial
practice in which Rule 60 [specifying grounds for relief from district
court judgments and orders] has been swallowed whole by Rule 15(b).
Id. at 500.
103
See, e.g., Maria Banda, Comment, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 321, 321 (2010) (listing a number of law firm “commentators . . . conclud[ing] that
the Supreme Court had created additional jurisdictional obstacles for environmental
plaintiffs to prove standing in cases involving procedural injuries”); see also Michelle Fon
Anne Lee, Note, Surviving Summers, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 381, 383 (2010) (“According to
certain commentators, Summers represents a significant tightening of standing
doctrine . . . .”).
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standing: namely, that any private party seeking redress from a court
must demonstrate a real injury for which redress is indeed meaningful.
That requirement applies regardless of whether the interest is
substantive, or simply an interest in seeing that the government follows
proper administrative procedures to implement its regulatory authority.
C. Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms
In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,104 the Supreme Court
addressed standing specifically within the context of a request for
injunctive relief from agency actions allegedly violating NEPA.
Monsanto does not concern climate change per se; however, the Court’s
treatment of the standing issue reinforces the importance of injury in fact
for any case involving claims under NEPA and related environmental
statutes.
Monsanto involved a decision by the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (“APHIS”), within the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, to deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa
known as “Roundup Ready Alfalfa” (“RRA”).105 The district court held
that APHIS violated NEPA by issuing its deregulation decision without
first completing an EIS.106 To remedy the violation, the district court: (1)
vacated the agency’s decision completely deregulating the alfalfa variety
in question; (2) ordered APHIS not to act on the deregulation petition in
whole, or in part, until it completed a detailed environmental review;
and (3) enjoined almost all future planting of the genetically engineered
alfalfa pending the completion of that review.107 The appellate court
subsequently affirmed the district court’s entry of permanent injunctive
relief.108
The Court addressed standing as a preliminary issue before
addressing the merits of the case:
Article III standing requires an injury that is (i) concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent, (ii) fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (iii) redressable
by a favorable ruling. Petitioners are injured by their
inability to sell or license RRA to prospective customers
until APHIS completes the EIS. Because that injury is
caused by the very remedial order that petitioners
104
105
106
107
108
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challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by a
favorable ruling from this Court.109
With respect to petitioners’ contention that respondents lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief, the Court rejected petitioners’
argument that respondents had failed to show that any of the named
respondents were likely to suffer a constitutionally cognizable injury
absent injunctive relief.110 The Court noted the district court’s finding
that respondents, including conventional alfalfa farmers, had
“‘established a “reasonable probability” that their organic and
conventional alfalfa crops will be infected with the engineered gene’ [in
RRA] if RRA is completely deregulated.”111 According to the Court, this
“reasonable probability of harm” was sufficient to establish standing:
Such harms, which respondents will suffer even if their
crops are not actually infected with the Roundup ready
gene, are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact
prong of the constitutional standing analysis. Those
harms are readily attributable to APHIS’s deregulation
decision, which, as the [d]istrict [c]ourt found, gives rise
to a significant risk of gene flow to non-geneticallyengineered varieties of alfalfa. Finally, a judicial order
109
Id. at 2747 (citation omitted). Among the arguments advanced in support of the fact
that the petitioners lacked standing was that petitioners’ injury was actually caused by the
district court’s vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision. Id. at 2754. “The practical
consequence of the vacatur was to restore RRA to the status of a regulated article, . . . the
growth and sale” of which ordinarily would be banned. Id. at 2752. “Because petitioners
did not specifically challenge the vacatur, respondents [argued that] they lacked standing
to challenge” issuance of an injunction that had no independent consequences for the
vacatur. Id. at 2753. The Court rejected this argument, finding that petitioners had
“preserved their objection [to] the vacated deregulation decision” by suggesting that the
vacatur “should have been replaced by [an] injunction” and that “if the [d]istrict [c]ourt
had adopted [this] suggested remedy, there would still be authority for the continued
planting of RRA because there would, in effect, be a new deregulation decision.” Id. at
2753. In addition, the Court stated that:
If the injunction were lifted, we do not see why the [d]istrict [c]ourt
would have to remand the matter to the agency in order for APHIS to
effect a partial deregulation. And even if a remand were required, we
perceive no basis on which the [d]istrict [c]ourt could decline to
remand the matter to the agency so that it could determine whether to
pursue a partial deregulation during the pendency of the EIS process.
Id. at 2754.
110
Id.
111
See id. at 2754–55 n.3 (“At least one of the respondents in this case specifically allege[d]
that he owns an alfalfa farm in a prominent seed-growing region and faces a significant
risk of contamination from RRA. Other declarations . . . [suggested] that the deregulation
of RRA pose[d] a significant risk of contamination . . . .”(internal citations omitted)).
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prohibiting the growth and sale of all or some
genetically
engineered
alfalfa
would
remedy
respondents’ injuries by eliminating or minimizing the
risk of gene flow to conventional and organic alfalfa
crops. We therefore conclude that respondents have
constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from the
complete deregulation order at issue here.112
The “reasonable probability of harm” test on which the Court relied
in Monsanto sounds similar to the “realistic likelihood” test employed by
the dissent, but rejected by the majority, in Summers. However, the harm
faced by the respondents in Monsanto was not just the probabilistic risk
that the crops of some of the respondents might be contaminated by the
modified RRA gene. Rather, the harm was the alleged non-probabilistic
certainty that those respondents would suffer an imminent economic
injury because of their need to take various costly measures to address
that risk, like testing to confirm whether contamination was, in fact,
present.113 The substantial and imminent nature of these economic
harms caused the Court to find injury in fact for standing purposes—the
realistic likelihood of crop contamination was, at most, a secondary
consideration.
Viewed from that perspective, the “reasonable
probability of harm” test that the Monsanto Court employed is entirely
consistent with the Court’s emphasis in prior cases on the necessity of a
concrete and imminent injury in fact for standing purposes (whether or
not the injury alleged is procedural).
V. STANDING UNDER NEPA IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence may seem clear, several
district courts have sought to grant standing in cases that seem
inconsistent with Court precedent. In particular, three cases—Border

Id. at 2755.
Id. The Court noted representations made in the declarations that:
[T]o continue marketing their product to consumers who wish to buy
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, respondents would have to conduct
testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been
contaminated. Respondents also allege that the risk of gene flow will
cause them to take certain measures to minimize the likelihood of
potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of nongenetically-engineered alfalfa.
Id. (citations omitted); see id. (echoing respondents who stated that, “‘[d]ue to the threat of
contamination, I have begun contracting with growers outside of the United States to
ensure that I can supply genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed’”). “‘Finding new
growers has already resulted in increased administrative costs at my seed business.’” Id.
112
113
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Power Plant Working Group v. DOE (“Border Power I”),114 Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Watson,115 and Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
Department of Interior116—seem out of line with Supreme Court mandates.
A. Expanding Lujan in Border Power I
Border Power I,117 one of the first cases brought under NEPA to
consider the issue of standing in the context of global climate change,
involved a decision by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and the
Federal Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) to forgo the preparation
of an EIS for the construction of transmission lines designed to connect
new Mexican power plants to the California power grid.118 The DOE and
the BLM independently prepared initial EAs for the project.119 Based on
the analysis contained in the EAs, both agencies “issued a [f]inding of
[n]o [s]ignificant [i]mpact,” each of which concluded that NEPA required
no further environmental review.120 The plaintiff, an organization
allegedly established for the sole purpose of challenging the project, filed
an action asserting that the agencies’ NEPA review was inadequate
because they failed to evaluate the impact of emissions from the Mexican
power plants that would be generating the electricity transported by the
transmission line project.121
The court first evaluated whether the plaintiff had standing under
NEPA and APA. Neither the DOE nor the BLM challenged the plaintiff’s
standing to bring the action in federal court. However, the district court
determined that an evaluation of standing was necessary in order to
establish jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims.122 The district court
began its standing analysis with a recitation of the Lujan criteria, but it
then observed that the most important of these three criteria in
procedural cases brought under NEPA and APA is the requirement of
injury in fact.123 According to the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court
See infra Part V.A (discussing Border Power I).
See infra Part V.B (discussing Friends of the Earth).
116
See infra Part V.C (discussing Center for Biological Diversity).
117
260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
118
See id. at 1006 (discussing how the DOE had been asked to issue “[p]residential
[p]ermits” to allow crossborder construction of the power lines). BLM had been asked to
issue similar permits for necessary rights of way across the United States where the lines
would be located. Id.
119
See id. at 1008.
120
Id.
121
See id.
122
See id. at 1008–11.
123
Id. at 1009. In this context, the district court cited footnote 7 in the Lujan plurality
opinion, which the court claimed acknowledged the special status of “‘procedural rights’”
in cases involving statutes like NEPA. Id. The Court stated that:
114
115
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of Appeals, in particular, has emphasized the importance of injury in fact
in procedural cases and reduced the elements that must be shown to
establish procedural standing to the following: “‘(1) that he or she is a
person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect [his or her]
concrete interests . . . and (2) that the plaintiff has some threatened
concrete interest . . . that is the ultimate basis of [his or her] standing.’”124
Having articulated its views on the applicable requirements for
standing under NEPA, the district court found that the plaintiff, an
association comprised of various individuals living near the proposed
transmission project, met those requirements.125 It based that finding on
the declarations of association members who allegedly lived “near” the
project (in either Imperial County, California or Mexicali, Mexico) and
“who shar[ed] a concern for the environmental health of the border
region.”126 Beyond that, it did not discuss with any specificity how the
proposed project would in fact result in a concrete injury that could form
the basis for standing under Lujan. In particular, the court did not
indicate whether it considered the potential contribution to global
warming by carbon dioxide emissions from the Mexican power plants as
a basis for plaintiff’s standing, even though it accepted plaintiff’s
evidence “that carbon dioxide emissions are the greatest by weight of all
pollutants emitted by natural gas turbines” of the sort proposed for use
in those facilities.127
After glossing over the standing question, the court considered
whether the alleged connection between the federal action and climate
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law,
one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally
licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s failure to
prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot
establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to
be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be
completed for many years.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
124
Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d. at 1010 (citing Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495,
1500 (9th Cir. 1995)); see Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 25 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that plaintiffs with an economic interest in preserving salmon have a
procedural interest in ensuring that the ESA is followed); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. U.S.
Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that residents who live near the site of a
proposed port have procedural standing to sue for the Navy’s alleged failure to follow
permitting regulations); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that a city located near a proposed freeway interchange has procedural standing to
challenge an agency’s failure to prepare an EIS).
125
See Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d. at 1010–11.
126
Id. at 1010 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id. at 1029.
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change warranted review under NEPA.128 To reach this issue, the court
first had to determine whether emissions from the proposed Mexican
power plants were properly within the scope of environmental review,129
as NEPA only applies to projects that are “subject to [federal] control and
responsibility.”130 The court concluded that they were properly excluded
from the scope of the proposed federal action for NEPA purposes
because the proposed power plants were outside of the jurisdiction of
the United States.131 The court went on to conclude, however, that
emissions from the plants could be considered as indirect or “cumulative
impact[s]” of the proposed federal action and, therefore, should have
been addressed in the EAs for the project.132
The court’s discussion in Border Power I of the potential
environmental impacts of power plant carbon dioxide emissions on
climate change was cursory at best. The court simply noted that: (1)
“[t]he record shows that carbon dioxide is one of the pollutants emitted
by a natural gas turbine and that it is a [GHG]”; (2) emissions from the
turbines to be used at the proposed power plants in Mexico “have
potential environmental impacts”; and (3) the government’s “failure to
disclose and analyze [the] significance” of carbon dioxide emissions “is
counter to NEPA.”133 The DOE subsequently issued an EIS that included
an evaluation of emissions from the proposed Mexican power facilities
as part of its analysis of project alternatives, but initial claims attacking
the document’s cumulative impact analysis were subsequently

See id. at 1012.
Id.
130
10 C.F.R. § 1021.104(b) (2007).
131
See Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
132
See id. at 1033. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily on the Ninth
Circuit’s decisions in Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105
(9th Cir. 2000) and Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1989). In
Wetlands Action Network, the court held that agencies are only required to consider impacts
associated with a non-federal action if the causal linkage between the two is such that the
non-federal action cannot proceed without the related federal action. 222 F.3d at 1118. In
Sylvester, the court held that federal agencies are required to consider the indirect or
cumulative impacts of a project that is not within the defined scope of a proposed federal
action, if that project and another project that is within federal jurisdiction constitute “two
links of a single chain.” 884 F.2d at 400. The court stated that it is not enough if one project
might benefit from the other project’s presence. Id. The link between the two projects must
be such that each action could not exist without the other. Id. The district court in Border
Power I concluded that, because one of the proposed Mexican power plants was to be
constructed solely for the purpose of supplying the U.S. energy grid over the proposed
transmission line, the two projects were sufficiently linked to require consideration of the
plant’s emissions under NEPA. 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
133
Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1028–29.
128
129
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dropped.134 In its final decision, the court did not address the adequacy
of the EIS’s analysis of potential climate change impacts.135 While Border
Power I stretched the contours of Lujan standing, another case, decided
two years later, continued this expansion.
B. Greater Standing Expansion under Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson,136 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California stretched the limits of standing criteria
articulated in Lujan even further than the Border Power I court had. The
plaintiffs were several U.S. cities and an environmental group, who
brought an action against two quasi-governmental agencies—the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) and the ExportImport Bank of the United States (“Ex-Im Bank” or “Ex-Im”)—to compel
the agencies to conduct EAs under NEPA to address the global warming
impacts of projects supported by the agencies outside of the United
States. The plaintiffs claimed that the impacts of global warming on the
United States’ environment required the agencies to address global
warming pursuant to NEPA, even though none of the projects supported
by the agencies were located in the United States.137 By making such an
assertion, plaintiffs sought to extend NEPA’s environmental review
requirements to GHG-emitting projects located throughout the world,
even where the involvement of U.S. governmental agencies is only
modest.
The actions challenged in the litigation involved a very limited role
that OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank play in supporting U.S. business interests
oversees. OPIC’s mission is “[t]o mobilize and facilitate the participation
of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social
development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in
134
See Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy (“Border Power II”), 467 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1040 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
135
See id. Plaintiffs challenged the EIS under NEPA, alleging that the EIS inadequately
considered project alternatives and mitigation measures and an alleged failure to ensure
the scientific accuracy of relied upon information; the court, however, rejected these
challenges in all respects. Id. at 1044–45.
136
No. C02-4106JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *35 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
137
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897–901 (N.D. Cal.
2007). The Watson and Mosbacher decisions were part of the same litigation over alleged
climate change consequences stemming from decisions by OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank. See
generally id.; Watson, 2005 WL 2035596. During the pendency of the litigation, Peter
Watson, who was named as a defendant in the first case in his capacity as President and
Chief Executive Officer of OPIC, was replaced by Robert Mosbacher, Jr., who was therefore
substituted in as a named defendant in the second phase of the litigation. Compare id. at *1
(naming Watson as the defendant), with Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (naming
Mosbacher as the defendant).
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transition from nonmarket to market economies . . . . ”138 It fulfills that
mission by providing: (1) political risk insurance; (2) financing through
loan guarantees; and (3) direct loans to transactions involving small U.S.
businesses.139 OPIC has no role in the development or approval of the
projects for which an applicant might seek insurance or loan guarantees
to cover the applicant’s risk of project participation.140 While OPIC
provides financial support for exports from the United States,141 the ExIm Bank provides export credit insurance and “guarantees to
commercial banks and other financial institutions in connection with
exports of U.S. capital goods and services, a variety of insurance
products for short- or medium-term credits, direct loans, and guarantees
for working capital loans made by commercial banks to U.S.
exporters.”142
One example of the role OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank play in
supporting projects outside the United States, cited repeatedly by the
parties and the district court, involves an oil pipeline in Chad and
Cameroon (“Chad-Cameroon Project”) for which both agencies provided
indirect financial assistance.143 The Chad-Cameroon Project was part of a
larger development project involving oil fields in Chad and oil-loading
facilities off of the coast of Cameroon. Its cost was an estimated $2.2
billion, and the cost of the larger development project was estimated to
be $3.5 billion.144 OPIC provided up to $250 million in political risk
insurance coverage to a subcontractor in the Chad-Cameroon Project that
supplied oil field drilling and related services.145 The Ex-Im Bank
separately provided a $200 million loan guarantee to a bank
participating in the financing of the larger development project, but did
not provide any direct financing for the Chad-Cameroon Project or the
component pipeline project.146 The loan guarantee by Ex-Im was
intended to cover only “‘political risks (primarily war and civil unrest,
expropriation and transfer risks)’ during the construction of the” ChadCameroon Project and after it “was completed and operati[onal].”147
22 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006).
See id. § 2194.
140
See Defendant OPIC’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 02–4106).
141
See 12 U.S.C. § 635 (2006).
142
See Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
143
Id. at 896.
144
Id. at 897.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 898.
147
Id. In addition to the Chad-Cameroon Project, the actions challenged by the plaintiffs
included: (1) loan guarantees to three mutual funds loaning money to an oil and gas
development project in eastern Russia; (2) a loan guarantee to U.S. capital market investors
138
139
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Both OPIC and Ex-Im have adopted guidelines requiring
assessments of the environmental impacts of certain approved
projects.148 OPIC’s guidelines were adopted pursuant to Section 117 of
the Foreign Assistance Act.149 Under those guidelines, OPIC is required
to conduct an [EIA], or an [IEA], or both,” for projects that are “‘likely to
have significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive (e.g.
irreversible, affect sensitive ecosystems, involve involuntary
resettlement, etc.), diverse, or unprecedented.’”150 The Ex-Im Bank’s
environmental review guidelines specifically “‘require adherence to
[NEPA’s] environmental review procedures’” for long-term project
financing, loans, and guarantees.151 An environmental review is not
mandatory for medium-term transactions, credit, and working capital
guarantees or short-term insurance products.152 OPIC and Ex-Im both
undertook analyses of the proposed projects at issue in the Watson
litigation under their respective environmental review guidelines.153
OPIC and Ex-Im disputed plaintiffs’ standing to challenge their
various funding decisions, claiming that, with respect to any of the
projects at issue, plaintiffs could not meet the three criteria for standing
required under Lujan:
(1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3)
redressability.154 The district court, however, found that the plaintiffs
met all three criteria for standing.155 On the issue of injury in fact, the
court found that, because plaintiffs’ NEPA challenge raised only
“procedural issues,” there was no requirement to show that a
substantive environmental harm was imminent or that the agencies’
support of foreign development “project[s] [would] have particular
environmental effects.”156 Instead, the “[p]laintiffs only” had to show
loaning money to a trust funding an oil and gas-development project in Indonesia; (3)
guarantees for U.S. companies exporting services and equipment to support a project to
enhance an existing offshore petroleum complex in Mexico; (4) guarantees for similar
goods and services to develop oil fields and a small refinery in Venezuela; and (5)
guarantees to a U.S. bank providing financing for the expansion of a coal-fired power plant
in China. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C02–4106JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
148
See Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 893, 895–96.
149
22 U.S.C. § 2151(p) (2006).
150
Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
151
Id. at 896 (alteration in original).
152
See id.
153
See id. at 896–97.
154
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C02–4106JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
155
See id. at *2–4.
156
Id. at *2 (citing Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 674 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)); see
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that requiring the plaintiffs to prove that the challenged federal project will have particular
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“that ‘it [was] reasonably probable that the challenged action [would]
threaten their concrete interests.’”157
The court noted that, “[w]hile they concede that the impact of [GHG]
emissions traceable to projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im are not yet
known with absolute certainty, [p]laintiffs contend the only uncertainty
is with respect to how great the consequences will be, and not whether
there will be any significant consequences.”158 The court listed a number
of contentions, drawn from a series of one-sided declarations, regarding
how much carbon dioxide would be emitted by the challenged projects.
The court stated that GHGs are the major contributor to global warming
in the twentieth century and further increases in GHG emissions will
continue to increase global warming with widespread environmental
impacts.159 The court further asserted that these impacts have and will
affect areas used and owned by the plaintiffs.160
On that basis, “[t]he [c]ourt conclude[ed] that [t]he [p]laintiffs’
evidence [was] sufficient to demonstrate that it is reasonably probable
that emissions from the projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im
supported projects will threaten [p]laintiffs’ concrete interests.”161 The
court failed to explain, however, which specific “concrete interests”
were, in fact, being threatened. The plaintiffs may have had a
generalized interest in maintaining the stability of the global climate.
However, it is entirely unclear that such an interest is sufficiently distinct
from the interests of any other member of the public in order to confer
standing to challenge agency actions in federal court.
The district court’s approach to standing in Watson directly conflicts
with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lujan. Among other things, the
district court ignored the fact that Lujan suggested that a close
geographical or economic nexus between a proposed project and alleged
injury, while not necessarily determinative, is important when the

environmental effects would essentially be imposing a requirement that the plaintiff
perform the same environmental investigation that he is attempting, through his suit, to
compel the agency to undertake). The irony, of course, is plaintiffs did not need to conduct
any new environmental analyses to establish standing, since for each of the projects
challenged by plaintiffs, OPIC and Ex-Im had already performed relevant environmental
analyses. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 896–97. Had the court taken those analyses into
account in its assessment of the issue, it would have made the court’s determination that
standing existed much more problematic.
157
Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969–70);
see City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
158
Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3 (citation omitted).
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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character of the injury is a procedural one.162 None of the projects
considered by the district court in Watson comprise the close geographic
or economic connection with the plaintiffs’ interests that the Supreme
Court had in mind in Lujan. The district court’s approach is, instead,
similar to Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan, suggesting that a
procedural injury per se—essentially, a grievance by an environmental
plaintiff premised solely on the failure of a government agency to follow
pertinent administrative procedures—is sufficient to establish the injury
in fact required to confer standing.163 The majority opinion in Lujan,
written by Justice Scalia, expressly rejected this approach, stating that:
“We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he
assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis
of his standing.”164
More importantly, Lujan directly stated:
that a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his
and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public
at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy.165
The district court in Watson provided no explanation as to how the
plaintiffs in that case had been harmed by the global warming impacts of
the projects at issue in any way that was distinct from harms that
arguably impacted U.S. citizens generally. Nor did the court explain
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
According to Justice Blackmun, “as a general matter, the courts owe substantial
deference to Congress’ substantive purpose in imposing a certain procedural
requirement. . . . There is no room for a per se rule or presumption excluding injuries
labeled ‘procedural’ in nature” as grounds to confer standing to plaintiffs in environmental
cases. Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Justice
Blackmun stopped short, however, of suggesting that procedural injuries without some
connection to a substantive harm, albeit an implicit one, are sufficient in this context. Id.
“There may be factual circumstances in which a congressionally imposed procedural
requirement is so insubstantially connected to the prevention of a substantive harm that it
cannot be said to work any conceivable injury to an individual litigant.” Id.
164
Id. at 573 n.8 (emphasis in original); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg &
Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 396 (2012) (“A court must engage in a fresh analysis of
traceability and redressability in each case for the specific plaintiffs, specific defendants,
specific harms alleged, and specific remedies sought.”).
165
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74.
162
163
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why the relief sought by plaintiffs provided any greater benefits to them
than it would to any other member of the public. In the absence of such
explanation, it is hard to see how the Watson plaintiffs could possibly
establish a sufficient injury in fact to meet the standards articulated in
Lujan.
C. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior
In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior,166
environmental interests challenged a federal leasing program for oil and
gas development on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) in the Beaufort,
Bering, and Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska. Petitioners alleged that
the Department of the Interior failed to consider climate change impacts
of the program pursuant to NEPA and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (“OCSLA”).167 The petitioners also alleged that the program
violated NEPA and OCSLA because the government did not conduct
sufficient baseline research for the affected Alaskan seas.168
The petitioners advanced two theories of standing, one substantive
Under the substantive theory, the
and the other procedural.169
petitioners relied on Massachusetts v. EPA to argue for standing on the
basis that the government’s “approval of the [p]rogram brings about
climate change, which in turn adversely affects the species and
ecosystems of those OCS areas, thereby threatening [p]etitioners’
enjoyment of the OCS areas and their inhabitants.”170 The court rejected
this approach, noting that, unlike the situation in Massachusetts v. EPA,
there was no sovereign like Massachusetts worthy of “‘special
solicitude’” for standing purposes.171 More importantly, however, the
court emphasized that the petitioners had not shown the kind of
particularized injury that Massachusetts had claimed. As the court
observed:
With respect to Massachusetts’s injury, the Court found
that Massachusetts “owns a substantial portion of the
state’s coastal property” that had already been harmed
by the EPA’s inaction, and that the EPA’s failure to

563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 471.
168
Id. at 472. The appellate court dismissed the plaintiff-petitioners’ NEPA and ESA
claims for lack of ripeness, but concluded that their OCSLA-based challenges were all
justiciable. Id.
169
Id. at 475.
170
Id. at 476.
171
Id. at 476–77.
166
167
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regulate these gases would cause additional harm to its
shoreline. Though the Court found that the risks of
climate change were widely shared because global sea
levels had already begun to rise, it nevertheless
concluded that Massachusetts had shown a sufficiently
particularized injury because Massachusetts had alleged
that its particular shoreline had actually been
diminished by the effects of climate change. In other
words, by showing that climate change had diminished
part of its own shoreline, Massachusetts itself had
shown that it had been affected “in a personal and
individual way” by the EPA’s failure to regulate
greenhouse gases.172
By contrast, the court found that none of the petitioners in the
present case alleged that the government’s actions would cause
individual harm; instead, they relied solely on the effects that the
government’s actions would have on the climate in general.173 The court
concluded that, as a result, the “[p]etitioners’ substantive theory of
standing fails because [p]etitioners have not established either the injury
or causation element of standing.”174 However, the court found that the
petitioners did have standing based on their procedural theory. The
court noted that, “a plaintiff may have standing if it can show that an
agency failed to abide by a procedural requirement that was ‘designed to
172
Id. at 476 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
n.1 (1992)).
173
Id. On the issue of causation, the court focused on the fact that linking the
government’s actions to any alleged injury required numerous assumptions involving the
behavior of others not involved in the litigation, stating that:
[T]o reach the conclusion that [p]etitioners are injured because of [the
government’s] alleged failure to consider the effects of climate change
with respect to the Leasing Program, [p]etitioners must argue that:
adoption of the Leasing Program will bring about drilling; drilling, in
turn, will bring about more oil; this oil will be consumed; the
consumption of this oil will result in additional carbon dioxide being
dispersed into the air; this carbon dioxide will consequently cause
climate change; this climate change will adversely affect the animals
and their habitat; therefore [p]etitioners are injured by the adverse
effects on the animals they enjoy. Such a causal chain cannot
adequately establish causation because [p]etitioners rely on the
speculation that various different groups of actors not present in this
case—namely, oil companies, individuals using oil in their cars, cars
actually dispersing carbon dioxide—might act in a certain way in the
future.
Id. at 478–79.
174
Id. at 478.
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protect some threatened concrete interest’ of the plaintiff.’”175 Under this
theory, “‘a procedural-rights plaintiff must show not only that the
defendant’s acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is
substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential
injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.’”176
The court concluded that the petitioners could rely on this theory to
bring both their OCSLA-based and NEPA-based climate change claims
because they had demonstrated “that they possess[ed] a threatened
particularized interest, namely their enjoyment of the indigenous
animals of the Alaskan areas listed in the Leasing Program.”177 The court
pointed out that the Supreme Court noted in Lujan that “‘the desire to
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is
undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.’”178 However,
the court made clear that “[t]his interest, however, will not suffice on its
own ‘without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any
specification of when’ the plaintiff will be deprived of the opportunity to
observe the potentially harmed species.”179 The court found that the
petitioners had met these requirements using affidavits demonstrating
their “immediate and definite interest in enjoyment of the animals” and
based on the fact that the government’s “adoption of an irrationally
based Leasing Program could cause a substantial increase in the risk to
their enjoyment of the animals affected . . . .”180
VI. CONCLUSION
Center for Biological Diversity was decided just a few weeks after the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Summers; thus, the appellate court
did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s affirmation in Summers
of the traditional requirements for standing in environmental cases.181
Nevertheless, of the various cases that have considered standing for
NEPA purposes in the context of global climate change, it is the court of
appeals’ decision in that case that comes the closest to “getting it right”
under the Supreme Court’s consistent approach to standing since Lujan.
For example, in Border Power I, the fact that the plaintiffs had
members who lived “near” the proposed transmission lines and
Id. at 479 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8).
See id. (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
177
Id.
178
Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).
179
Id. (emphasis in original).
180
Id.
181
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior was decided on April 17,
2009—six weeks after the Summers decision—and oral argument in the case was completed
some months before that. 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
175
176
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associated power facilities, and who shared “a concern for the
environmental health” of the region, by itself, did not say anything about
how the failure to adequately analyze those facilities’ GHG emissions
resulted in an injury that was “actual” or “imminent.” The plaintiffs
never demonstrated how they would be injured by global warming, and
the court did not indicate that it had considered the potential
contribution to global warming by GHG emissions from the facilities as
relevant to the plaintiffs’ standing. Living in close proximity to the site
of a proposed federal action may impact the magnitude of a potential
injury to one’s concrete interests, but that alone should not be enough to
demonstrate that there is an injury. Under Monsanto, plaintiffs in Border
Power I should have been required to show that the GHG emissions
associated with the proposed project created a “reasonable probability of
harm” to their interests in the environment—the fact that they were not
so required should have been fatal to their NEPA standing.
This is hardly to say that concerns over the impact of GHG emissions
on climate change can never provide the basis for a challenge to federal
action under NEPA. Center for Biological Diversity shows that it can be
under appropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, courts should be careful
to recognize that using NEPA as a litigation strategy may have limited
value as a weapon in any war on global warming. After more than a
quarter century of judicial development, the rules governing standing
under NEPA and other federal environmental laws are well established,
and they necessarily focus on relatively localized impacts from domestic
projects, which have a substantial federal connection with the United
States. Those rules are not intended to apply to highly-generalized
impacts associated with a global phenomenon like climate change,
caused by activities diffusely spread across the planet. In the case of
agency actions, like those considered in Watson, a requirement to prepare
detailed environmental impact studies under NEPA will not reduce
global warming in any appreciable way.
The stage for an approach to regulate GHG emissions under the
CAA has now been set with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA.182 Whether and to what extent that more rational
approach is supported by our nation’s policy makers remains to be seen.

182
Now effectively confirmed by the Court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). Some commentators argue GHG emission regulation will occur
through Supreme Court decisions like Massasschusets v. EPA and Connectiuct v. American
Electric Power Co. because of Congressional deadlock. See Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role
in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulations: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46
VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 447 (2012).
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